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Abstract
Banks supply liquidity to insure individuals against possible short-term consumption shocks.
The higher this level of illiquidity insurance the lower the investments in long run assets, and the
higher the risk of a bank run generated by a real negative shock. If individuals are sufficiently risk
averse, competitive banks trade off liquidity insurance for portfolio risk. High growth expectations,
typical of emerging economies, increase the optimal liquidity supply even when this increases the
risk of a bank run. On the contrary, deposit contracts offered when economic performances are
very uncertain (like in less developed economies), and where output fluctuations are milder (like
in developed economies), are less exposed to the risk of a bank run. In this setting, a bail-out in
case of crisis is ex-ante Pareto efficient even if it always increases the risk of crisis.
KEYWORDS: illiquidity insurance, portfolio risk, bank run, growth expectations
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1 Introduction
Banking crises are familiar occurrences in developing economies. Indeed, by
some measures, over 70% of banking crises in the last quarter century took
place in developing countries.1 Table 1 shows the frequency of crisis in coun-
tries with di¤ering growth patterns and it seems to support this regularity
banking crises are more frequent in economies during phases of sustained
and continuous growth, suggesting that rapidly developing economies may
be particularly susceptible to banking crises.2
Table 1: Frequencies of crisis and economic growth,
198219993
Years of previous growth > 3% #Crisis
#Obs:
# Observations
less than 5 .031 1668
5 or more :0974 82
Years of previous growth > 5%
less than 5 :032 1729
5 or more :1425 21
all observations :034 1750
Accordingly, this paper investigates the link between economic develop-
ment and banking crisis, emphasizing a possible mechanism through which
high growth expectations typical for a taking-o¤ economy result in increased
1See Londgren, Garcia and Saal (1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), Caprio and
Kilinger (1999), Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2002).
2Since the business cycles typical of modern developed economies feature a peak and
a low about every ve years, we argue that a growth rate exceeding 3 percent for ve
or more years is compatible mostly with emerging economies. In the data used in Table
1, the subsample does not include even one of the top ten richest countries (in terms of
1998 per capita income) and Ireland is the only country in top 20 (see the last section for
dataset details and the list of fast-growing countries selected by our criteria).
3Data on crisis elaborated from Caprio and Kligebiel (1999) and Lindgren, Garcia and
Saal (1996). Growth rates are from World Bank, WDI database. The actual years of crisis
are excluded. In the nal section of this paper, we provide a more accurate description
the dataset.
4An OLS regression of the probability of crisis on a binary dummy selecting countries
with 5 or more years of growth greater than 3 percent per year gives a signicant coe¢ cient
at the 99 percent level (coe¤. 0.067; std err 0.020).
5An OLS regression of the probability of crisis on a binary dummy selecting countries
with 5 or more years of growth greater than 5 percent per year gives a signicant coe¢ cient
at the 99 percent level (coe¤. 0.11; std err 0.039).
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fragility of the banking system. We demonstrate that rational individuals in
fast-growing economies tend to increase their demand for liquidity to smooth
their consumption path, especially when consumption is initially low. Com-
petitive banks respond by increasing the liquidity supply even if this implies
higher exposure to nancial crises. Individuals, in turn, accept the increased
risk because of the consumption-smoothing utility.
We analyze a simple model based on the classic Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) model (henceforth DD model), where banks supply demand deposit
contracts to provide an insurance against illiquidity shocks, investing some of
depositorsliquid capital in long-term assets. A high level of liquidity supply
exposes the bank to a crisis in the case of a negative shock hitting banks
investment portfolios. Assuming individuals are su¢ ciently risk averse com-
petitive banks trade o¤ liquidity supply  to cover individuals illiquidity
shocksfor portfolio risk. Therefore, a lower level of future expected volatil-
ity and (or) higher expected returns, by increasing the optimal illiquidity
insurance, increase the risk of crisis.
In other words, individuals prefer to transform into more illiquidity insur-
ance (then into more liquidity supply) part of the utility deriving from the
higher expected return on investments, even if they know that more liquidity
supply increases the risk of a banking crisis. Interestingly, our setting em-
phasizes that the only necessary condition for high growth expectations that
enhance nancial fragility is a su¢ ciently high level of risk aversion. This
happens because only su¢ ciently risk-averse individuals choose an high level
of insurance for the illiquidity risk and, therefore, need to trade o¤ illiquidity
risk with long-term portfolio risk.
Our result underlines a non-monotonic relationship between bank fragility
and degree of development. High growth expectations typical of emerging
economies increase the risk of bank run. Conversely, the risk of bank runs are
lower in underdeveloped and highly developed economies. For less developed
economies, investments and growth are uncertain, so individuals need only
limited illiquidity insurance to reduce portfolio risk and avoid the harms of a
possible bank run. In developed economies, output uctuations are typically
insu¢ cient to trigger a bank run, so the deposit contracts o¤ered by the
banks are essentially bank-run proof.
Perhaps less intuitively, we also note that the increased vulnerability to
banking crises in fast-developing countries can be welfare-maximizing. In our
setting, bank bail-outs can be ex-ante Pareto e¢ cient even if they increase
bank vulnerability. This is because bail-outs decrease the cost of a crisis
for individuals and, therefore, give them an incentive to bear increased risk.
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This is ex-ante Pareto e¢ cient being the result of an increase in the set of
consumption bundles available to all individuals.
Finally, when we explicitly introduce (as an extension of our main model)
the liquidation costs for long-term assets, we show that the high liquidity of
an asset itself can increase the fragility of the banking system. The obvious
explanation here is that a higher level of asset liquidity decreases the cost of
the crisis and induces the bank to supply a riskier deposit contract.
Our analysis reveals a link between the level of economic development and
bank fragility arising from growth expectations; to the best of our knowledge,
this result is new with respect to the existing literature.
Recent contributions addressing the issue of nancial crisis in emerging
countries fall broadly into two groups. One strand of the literature points
focuses on the presence of excessive short-term foreign-denominated assets at
the start of crises.6 This literature deals extensively with currency crises and
their connection to banking crises, and is particularly relevant to the nan-
cial distress of emerging markets in the mid-1990s.7 Nevertheless, empirical
evidence does not support general application of a link between currency and
banking crises.8 The second strand of literature on nancial crisis in devel-
oping countries focuses on the role of bad loans in the banking system, a.k.a.
over-borrowing syndrome, born out of crony relations between investors and
governments through banks.9 This explanation also does not generalize well.
Krugman (1999), for example, points out how this interpretation implies that
the economic fundamentals of the economy before crisis hits must be poor,
which simply is not always true.10
Therefore, even granting that the mechanisms cited above may well have
the played fundamental roles in certain nancial crises, we argue that there
may be additional explanations for the weakening or systemic collapse of
banking systems in emerging countries. Here, we investigate the explanatory
power of another channel, that, unlike in earlier literature, is not linked to a
particular pathology present in the economy. Accordingly, our explanation
6Radelet and Sachs (1998), Chang and Velasco (2001), Neeman and Orosel (2002),
among others.
7See e.g. Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1998).
8Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), and Eichengreen and Arteta (2000). See also
the empirical observations presented at the end of this article.
9Mc Kinnon and Pill (1996), Krugman (1998), Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999),
Femminis and Ruggerone (2004), among others.
10The empirical evidence for this link is mixed at best. For example, Caprio and Kinge-
beil (1996b) nd no evidence that a nancial crisis is proceeded by a period of lending
boom. See also the empirical observations presented at the end of this article.
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is not linked to a particular wave of crisis and, in this sense, is related to
the line of argument used by Allen and Gale (1998), who analyze the impact
of an economic downturn on the bank run with the aim to determine the
characteristics of optimality of a deposit contract allowing for a bank run
equilibrium. Unlike the Allen-Gale article, however, we analyze the link
between the likelihood of a crisis and growth expectations. In this case,
an economic downturn only triggers a crisis when its ex-ante probability is
su¢ ciently low.
In terms of economic policy, the literature is heavy with discussions of
the potentially bad e¤ects of external intervention insuring banks against
the risk of premature asset liquidation (e.g. deposit insurance and bail-
out). The contributions based on the over-borrowing syndrome as a cause of
nancial fragility emphasize how external insurance exacerbates moral hazard
problems to increase banksfragility. Our framework adds perspective for the
regulator by discussing another channel through which a bail-out, even if it
increases banking system fragility, may nevertheless be welfare-improving.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we analyze the
main model, assuming that a long-term asset can be liquidated at no cost
at time 1. In section 3, we consider the economic policy implications of the
main model. In section 4, we relax the assumption of zero liquidation cost
of long-term assets. In section 5, we conclude by showing some empirical
observations.
2 The Theoretical Framework
The model of banking here follows the DD model, but assumes that asset
revenue is random and that a bank run can be generated by a bad real sig-
nal on economic performance. Individuals take the risk of a bank run into
account ex ante and decide the level of insurance against the risk of illiq-
uidity. While most papers based on the DD model deal with di¤erentiating
between real-shock-driven and sunspot-driven bank runs,11 we focus here
solely on real-shock-driven bank runs to determine the external conditions
that increase the exposure of banking systems to nancial crisis.12
11Gorton (1987), Chiari and Jaganathan (1988), Jacklin and Battacharya (1988), Gold-
stain and Pauzner (1999), Gren and Li (2000), and Peck and Shell (2003) among others.
See Freixas and Rochet (1999) and the more recent Gorton and Winton (2002) for an
excellent survey on the argument.
12The empirical evidence suggests that bank runs are triggered by real shocks rather
than sunspots as in the original DD model. See e.g. the survey of Gorton and Winton
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Economy description
In our economy, there is a continuum of agents with mass 1 and a single
good that can be consumed or invested. Every agent owns a unit of endow-
ment at t = 0 and lives for three periods. The good can be costlessy stored
or invested in an illiquid asset, which consists of a share of the market portfo-
lio that we assume perfectly correlates with the aggregate production in the
economy. In order to fully solve the model so that we will can perform com-
parative statics with growth expectations, we assume the simplest portfolios
return distribution: a unit invested at time 0 yields, after two periods, Rl
with probability 1  q and (slightly abusing the notation) Rh = Rl + r with
probability q, where r > 0: If agents perceive that the economy is on a path
of high growth, q is close to 1. Conversely, q is close to 0 in a stagnating econ-
omy. We dene ~R as the random variable describing the returns on portfolio
with E( ~R) > 1, Ri the realization of ~R and R the asset return vector. The
performance of the economy at time 2 is public knowledge at time 1, after
the agent receives a perfect signal about the state of the economy, while at
time 0, all agents have identical growth expectations described by Rl; r and
q.
A unit invested in the asset at time 0 can be disinvested and yields p unit
of the good at time 1. We rst assume simply that p = 1. This assumption
implies that it is optimal at t = 0 to invest the entire wealth in the illiquid
asset. In section 4, we relax this assumption and solve the model for a
general p: Finally, for expositional simplicity (to ensure that the asset is ex
ante always demanded for any level of individuals risk aversion and any
probability q); we assume Rl > 1:13
We consider two types of individuals: patientand impatient.Every
individual knows their types only at time 1, while at time 0 each individual
knows that she will be impatient with a probability of 1
2
: An impatient in-
dividual obtains no utility in consuming at t = 2, while a patient individual
obtains her utility only from consuming at time 2. A typical consumers
utility function at t = 0 can thus be written as
U(c1; c2) =

u(c1) With prob. 12
u(c2) With prob. 12 :
;
(2002, p.77).
13Otherwise, we should have xed a minium Rl dependent on q and on the individuals
risk aversion such that investing in the assets is strictly preferred than holding liquidity
at time 2.
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where ct denotes consumption at time t = 1; 2: We dene the event of being
impatient as the risk of illiquidity shock.
As usual, we assume function u() twice continuously di¤erentiable, in-
creasing, strictly concave, unbounded above, and with limc!0 u`(c) = 1:
Moreover, individuals are su¢ cientlyrisk averse, so that
 cu
00(c)
u0(c)
> 1: (1)
This is a standard assumption in the DD model; it ensures that individuals
are willing to insure themselves against an illiquidity shock choosing c1 > 1.
Given assumption (1), we will see that individuals desire to translate part of
the utility derived from a less risky outcome in the long run to more insurance
against short-term illiquidity, even if this would imply higher risk of a bank
run.14
Demand deposit contract and bank run
As the DDmodel shows, a bank can optimally increase individualsutility
by pooling all their investments and insuring individuals against idiosyncratic
illiquidity shocks. Accordingly, we now determine the optimal contract, con-
ditional onRl; r and q; that a bank o¤ers its customers to ensure them against
the illiquidity shock and analyze the risk of a information-based bank run:
For expositional simplicity, we determine the level of c1 and c2 that can trig-
ger a banking crisis at levels of Rl and r; and then endogenize the optimal
choice of c1 and c2 and determine the likelihood of a bank run triggered by
the event Ri = Rlas a function of Rl; r and q:
As in the Allen-Gale case, we assume that the signal about the econ-
omy cannot be made into a contract condition. Therefore, c1 cannot directly
be made contingent on Ri: Accordingly, individuals surrender their entire
endowment to the bank, which at time t = 0 o¤ers a deposit contract de-
ned by the type and state-dependent consumption bundle (c1; c2(R)), where
14For our purposes, it is instructive to think of (1) in terms of the inverse of elasticity
of substitutions, i.e.
  u
0(c)
cu00(c)
< 1:
Put in this way, we see that assumption (1) implies a preference to translate part of the
increase in expected returns at time 2 into time 1 consumption. Therefore, individuals
prefer a smoother consumption path. Higher expected returns in the long run always
translate into higher short-term consumption rather than into higher long-run investment
(i.e. the income e¤ect outweighs the substitution e¤ect).
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c2(R) = [c2(R
h); c2(R
l)]:
As it is not apparent who is patient and who is impatient in the midst
of a bank run, it is possible that some patient individuals decide to go to
the bank and withdraw their savings at time t = 1 if circumstances warrant.
To account for the possibility that a patient individual withdraw at t = 1,
we introduce further notation. Let c2;t denote the consumption of patient
individuals who withdraw at time t = (1; 2): Hence, c2;1 is the consumption
of patient individuals who withdraw at time 1. Recalling that the good
is perfectly storable and types are private information, patient individuals
withdraw at time 1 if c2;1 = c1 > c2;2. Let  be the mass of early withdrawers
  so that a bank run implies  > 1
2
  and assume the following timing and
bank behavior in case of a run:
1. The bank respects sequential (rst come, rst served) service and gives
c1 to the rst  = 12 individuals.
2. The bank liquidates and distributes its remaining capital (1   1
2
c1) to
all customers, whether or not they joined the queue.
We assume the bank does this after formally closing the counter, so that
it is not bound to respect sequential service after point 2. Accordingly, all
remaining individuals receive the same amount (2   c1): This sequence of
events appears to reect actual bank behavior during a run. Bank runs
typically arise unexpectedly; it often takes banks several days to fulll the
requests of an unexpectedly large number of withdrawers. Accordingly, banks
normally serve the rst customers arriving at the counter, but at some point,
perhaps when the bank exhausts its cash on hand, the counter closes and the
bank devotes time to liquidating assets. At this point, the bank distributes
equally to all the remaining customers the liquidity realized from the asset
sales. Alternatively, we may assume that the government decides to suspend
convertibility once it is certain a run is taking place, i.e. if earlier withdrawers
are more than 1
2
:15
We note that c2;2(R) = (2   c1)R in the equilibrium with no run (i.e. if
 = 1
2
) and we state the following
15Although such behavior is realistic, it is not the only possible behavior, for example
Allen and Gale consider an equal treatment for all customers. We will argue below how
any other rule involving e¢ ciency loss from the bank run would not change qualitatively
our results.
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Lemma 1 Whenever
c1 >
2Ri
Ri + 1
: (2)
the information-based bank run is the only Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. see Appendix.
Condition (2) is only su¢ cient for a run. As the DD model and its o¤-
spring extensively emphasize, as long as c1 > 1, there are multiple equilibria
and, therefore, the possibility of a bank run generated only by sunspots.
However, here we rule out the possibility of pure panic-based bank runs to
focus solely on bank runs generated by economic fundamentals as determined
by condition (2). The literature usually refers to these as information-based
bank runs.
Finally, before determining the optimal deposit contract, it is useful to
demonstrate a second lemma:
Lemma 2 If R = Rh there is never an information-based bank run.
Proof. See Appendix.
The Optimal Demand Deposit Contract
Using lemma 1 and lemma 2, we argue that a bank run takes place only
if:
R = Rl and c1 >
2Rl
Rl + 1
(3)
Since everybody observes the signal at the same time and runs to the
counter when conditions (3) are true, 1
2
is the probability of being in the rst
1
2
to arrive at the counter with other early withdrawers.16
Moreover, recalling that the bank cannot discriminate between patient
and impatient types, c2;1 = c1: Accordingly, the agentsutility at time 0,
conditional that the run happens, is 1
2
u(c1) +
1
2
u(2(1   1
2
c1)): While, the
ex-ante utility with no run is 1
2
u(c1) +
1
2
E
h
u(2(1  1
2
c1) ~R)
i
.
16The simplifying assumption that everybody observes the signal does not a¤ect the
nal result. We can more realistically assume that only a share s of individuals receive the
signal. Thus, if s is the probability of receiving the signal, 12=
s+1
2 =
1
(1+s) is the probability
of being in the rst 12 to arrive at the counter. Since the probability of being an early
runner is 12 (1 + s), the ex-ante probability of being among the rst
1
2 is simply
1
2 :
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Since banks are in competition, they maximize individualsutility. As a
result, given conditions (3), we write the problem for the bank as follows:
max
c1(Rl;r;q)
fV br(Rl; r; q);V rp(Rl; r; q)g (4)
V rp(Rl; r; q) = max
c1
1
2
u(c1) +
1
2
 
qu
 
(2  c1)(Rl + r)

+ (1  q)u(2  c1)Rl

(5)
subject to c1  2R
l
Rl + 1
; (6)
V br(Rl; r; q) = max
c1
1
2
u(c1) +
1
2
 
qu
 
(2  c1)(Rl + r)

+ (1  q)u(2  c1)

(7)
subject to c1 >
2Rl
Rl + 1
:
Hence, if the contract is bank-run proof, the expected utility from the
contract is V rp(Rl; r; q). Otherwise, the expected utility is V br(Rl; r; q) and
a bank run is possible.
Now, if we dene c11 :
u0(c11) = q(R
l+r)u0

2(1  1
2
c11)(R
l + r)

+(1 q)Rlu0

2(1  1
2
c11)R
l

(8)
and c21 :
u0(c21) = q(R
l + r)u0

2(1  1
2
c21)(R
l + r)

+ (1  q)u0

2(1  1
2
c21)

(9)
we can more generally state
Proposition 1 If individuals are su¢ ciently risk averse, so that condition
(1) is true. There exists a r > 0 such that for any given r > r and Rl; the
solution of (4) can be expressed as:
c1 =
8<:
c11(q) if q  q
2Rl
Rl+1
if q < q  q
c21(q) q > q
; (10)
with c11(q)  2R
l
Rl+1
< c21(q). Therefore, the risky contract (strictly) dominates
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the bank-run-proof contract if, and only if, q > q (q > q), with @q
@r
< 0 and
@q
@r
< 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
To better illustrate proposition 1, we numerically solve problem (4). We
assume a CRRA utility function with  = 2, and Rl = 1:01, Rh = Rl +
r = 1:05. A sample solution is provided in Figure 1, where we analyze the
optimal contractual choice with respect to di¤erent levels of q: When the
q  q constraint (6) is not binding, it implies that there is only one available
contract that solves problem (4). This is determined by subproblem 5 and
is bank-run proof. When the q < q  q ; constraint (6) is binding and
V rp > V br, agents prefer a safe contract and choose c1 = 2R
l
Rl+1
. Finally, when
q > q then V br > V rp : the expected utility for a risky contract is so high
that agents choose it despite the risk of a bank run.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1.005
1.015
1.02
c1
q
Bank run Proof
Deposit Contract
Risky
Deposit
Contract
qq
Figure 1: Deposit contract and risk.
To illustrate the implications of proposition 1, it is useful to refer again
to our example. Now, however, we consider r as a variable (and keep Rl =
1:01 and  = 2), so that we can determine functions q(r) and q(r): As
shown in Figure 2, we represent the optimal contract with respect to growth
expectations and analyze the risk of bank run under three scenarios:
1. Less-developed economies, where r can be large but q is small: there is
at the best an high level of uncertainty, given the production structure
is not diversied.
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2. Developing economies with a large r and a relatively small q given to
the good perspectives of future growth.
3. Developed economy, where growth expectations are lower than in de-
veloping countries, so that r is relatively small.
In less-developed economies, economic performances are at the best un-
certain, hence demanding a high level of liquidity insurance would be too
risky and, therefore, banks face no risk of bank run. At the other extreme,
the developed economies scenario, given that r is relatively small, an e¢ cient
illiquidity insurance does not trigger a run even in the event of a bad shock.
Finally in Scenario 2, the developing economy environment, agents prefer
more short-term insurance, given that r is big and the probability of a bad
shock, 1  q; is su¢ ciently low, at the cost of risking a bank run.
q
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
)(rq
)(rq
rRl r
Less Developed
Countries
Developed
Countries
Developing
Countries
Risky
Contracts
Bank run
Proof
Contracts
Figure 2: Optimal contract as a function of q; r; Rl:
Repayment rules adopted by banks in the event of a run
We now argue how our results only depend on the existence of some
e¢ ciency loss following the bank run. It is robust to the introduction of
another rule of payment in case of a run. In a hypothetical benchmark case,
Allen and Gale show that when long-term assets cannot be liquidated early
(i.e. there is not a secondary nancial market) and where banks treat all
individuals in the same way in case of a run, the usual deposit contract
11
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achieve a rst best e¢ cient level of intertemporal insurance, even if an early
bad signal can potentially cause a bank run. In this case, no contract can do
better than a deposit contract even if there is a positive probability of bank
run in case of a low R (dened above as a risky contract).17 As in Allen
and Gales benchmark case, the option dened above as a bank-run-proof
contractis never chosen.
Allen and Gale also note, however, that if we introduce the possibility
of an early asset liquidation, the risky contract ceases to be e¢ cient as the
assets liquidation cost rises. This creates the possibility that a contract
specically set to avoid the bank run is the optimal solution. Specically,
consider our setting under the alternative assumption of equal treatment for
all withdrawers in case of a run. Here, all individuals obtain a utility equal
to u(1) (strictly less than u(c1)) with an aggregate liquidation cost equal
Rl   1. Under this alternative assumption, our model results do not change
qualitatively as competitive banks will trade o¤ this liquidation cost with
the benet of an higher level of intertemporal insurance, so a bank-run-proof
contract will sometime result the welfare-optimizing choice.18
Obviously, this reasoning holds if we consider a pure rst-come-rst-
served rule, where banks give c1 to every eager arrivals at the counter and
nothing to late-comers. In this case, there is also an e¢ ciency loss (generated
by the early asset liquidation plus the non insurable risk of arriving late in
case of bank run), so banks will trade o¤ this cost with the benet of a higher
illiquidity insurance and sometimes choose a bank-run-proof contract as in
our model.
Therefore, as far as there is a loss in e¢ ciency following the bank run
(i.e. we are not in the AG benchmark case of equal treatment rule plus
asset illiquidity), competitive banks may decide to supply a bank run proof
contract if the probability a negative shock is high. Thus, our main results
still hold.
3 Economic policy
In the previous section, we saw a bank o¤er a safe contract and supply a lower
level of illiquidity insurance when the uncertainty about the future is high to
17The proof is in the main section of Allen and Gales paper.
18Note that our rst-come-rst-serve rule of payment, if compared with the equal treat-
ment rule, involves higher bank run costs since the former rule implies a non-insurable
risk of arriving late to the counter.
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avoid the costs of early asset liquidation caused by a bank run. Therefore, a
policy of bail-out aimed at decreasing or avoiding the costs of early liquida-
tion induces banks to o¤er risky contracts, even in economic environments
with high long-term uncertainty. However, even if a bail-out policy increases
nancial fragility, it is ex-ante Pareto-improving provided that it does not
have other costs for the economy either in terms of opportunity costs or in
terms of ine¢ cient distortions of investment choices. In other words, all indi-
viduals are strictly better o¤ at time 0, when a central agency is committed
to intervene in case of crisis.
In a bail-out policy, a central agency, in the event of a run, is committed to
acquiring banks assets, or equivalently, to lending money to banks using their
illiquid assets as a collateral. Thus, this policy is zero-cost (if we abstract
from the opportunity costs) in the sense that the agency lends at time 1 an
amount 2(1  1
2
c1)R
l to the bank, which then completely repays the loan at
time 2 when it liquidates assets and realizes Rl:
Such lending avoids the loss 2(1   1
2
c1)(R
l   1) for the bank when it
liquidates assets: As a result, c2(Rl) = 2(1  12c1)Rl, no matter whether there
is a bank run or not. The new problem then becomes
max
c1
1
2
u(c1) +
1
2
E(u((2  c1) ~R); (11)
and the optimal consumption bundle, say (cbo1 ; c
bo
2 (R)) is determined as
u0(cbo1 ) = q(R
l + r)u0(2(1  1
2
cbo1 )(R
l + r)) + (1  q)Rlu0(2(1  1
2
cbo1 )R
l);
(12)
c2(R) = 2(1  1
2
cbo1 )R (13)
We note that the optimal consumption bundle (cbo1 ; c
bo
2 (R)) generated by
problem (11) dominates (c1; c

2(R)) from problem (4) since it avoids the cost
of early asset liquidations.19
Furthermore, comparing (8) and (9) with (12) we can see that cbo1 = c

1
if q q while cbo1 > c1 for q > q. The presence of a bail-out increases the
interval of q when a run takes place.
19More formally, when q  q or when Ri = Rh both (c1; c2(R)) and (cbo1 ; cbo2 (R)) belong
to the feasible sets fS(i) : c2  (2   c1)Ri):On the contrary, when q > q and R = Rl;
(cbo1 ; c
bo
2 (R
l)) 2 fS(l) : c2  (2  c1)Rl) while (c1; c2(Rl)) 2 fS` : c2  (2  c1)) with S` 
S(l): Therefore (c1; c

2(R)) is always avaiable when (c
bo
1 ; c
bo
2 (R)) is chosen.
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Figure 3: Optimal contract with external intervention
This is illustrated in Figure 3, where we present the deposit contract when
individuals expect a bail-out. Whenever q > q, a run will take place in the
bad state, Rl. While, in the same state of nature and without bail-out, a run
will only take place if q > q as shown in Figure 2. Therefore, a bank run is
more likely to happen in when agents expect a bail-out in the sense that the
risky region is bigger in Figure 3 than in Figure 2.
It is important to emphasize, however, that the above result hold only in
this simplied setting. For the more complex real world, regulators need to
consider two caveats:
i) The extent to which the cost of the higher risk of bank run outweighs
the benet is subject to our assumption that a bail-out can be imple-
mented at no cost. If we assume some opportunity cost of the funds
necessary for the bail-out (i.e. there are diverted from more protable
investments) and not internalized by depositors, the ultimate impact
of the external intervention becomes ambiguous.
ii) Ine¢ ciency also arises from the fact that expectations of a bail-out
generate moral hazard problems. For example, we can assume in case
of bad aggregate shock, good investments yield Rl = Rlg > 1: Bad
investments, in turn, yield Rl = Rlb < 1, so banks must bear a selection
cost c > 0 to identify their good investments. If banks expect a bail-out
where all investments will be bailed out for an amount pbo  Rlb, they
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may not want to spend c to select the right investments, and there will
be a positive share of bad investments that are not liquidated at time
1 even if would be e¢ cient to do so.20
Accordingly, this section emphasizes a possible benet from an bail-out
and the fact that the usually invoked increased fragility of the banking system
is not necessarily a reason to avoid such intervention. Clearly, the cost im-
plied by caveats i) and ii) have to be carefully weighted before an automatic
bail-out mechanism is put in place.
4 Costly liquidation
In this section, we consider the more general case where the asset can be
liquidated in the asset market at a price p < 1.21 In particular, we show
that a higher liquidation price that reduces the cost of early liquidation can
induce the bank to supply risky contracts that increase the probability of a
bank run. At the same time, however, the higher liquidation price represents
an improvement in the aggregate utility for the economy.
Assume for the sake of simplicity that individuals know ex-ante the liq-
uidation price p if Ri = Rl and there is a bank run. In this case, the bank
at time 0, besides having to decide on the level of c1; must decide on the
allocation of its money (level L of liquidity and 1  L in illiquid assets).
Since p < 1, a bank will liquidate the asset only if there is bank run.
Otherwise, it prefers to invest in L. Accordingly, the bank run condition
becomes
c1 > L+R(1  L); (14)
and the banksproblem becomes
max
c1(Rl;r;q;p)
fV brL (Rl; r; q; p);V rpL (Rl; r; q)g (15)
V rpL (R
l; r; q) = max
c1;c2(R);L
u(c1) +
1
2
E(u(2((1  L) ~R + L  1
2
c1) )
if c1  L+R(1  L)
20This cost could be lowered or avoided if the bailing-out agency commits ex-ante to
rescue only good investments e¤ectively yielding Rlg:
21If p  1; this case is not qualitatively di¤erent from the previous section, since there
is no incentive for the bank to retain liquidity.
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V rpL (R
l; r; q; p) = max
c1;c2(R);L
u(c1)+
1
2

qu

2((1  L)Rh + L  1
2
c1

+ (1  q)u

2((1  L)p+ L  1
2
c1

if c1 > L+R(1  L):
As in the previous section, we split problem (15) in two sub-problems.
First, considering a bank-run-proof contract, we notice that c1 = 2L, so
there is no need here to retain extra liquidity and banks will be reluctant to
liquidate at time t = 1, since p < 1. Hence, the run-proof optimal contract
can be described as
max
L
1
2
u(2L) +
1
2
(Eu (2((1  L)R))) ; (16)
subject to
L  R
l
1 +Rl
: (17)
The last constraint applies since a run can only occur when Ri = Rl:As
stated above in lemma 2, it can never be an optimal contract if a crisis takes
place anywhere in the world).
If the contract allows a bank run to happen in the event R = Rl, the
problem becomes
max
c1;L
1
2
u(c1) +
1
2
(qu

2((1  L)Rh + L  1
2
c1)

+ (1  q)u

2((1  L)p+ L  1
2
c1)

), (18)
subject to
c1 > L+R(1  L): (19)
Considering problem (15), we show that
Proposition 2 When individuals are su¢ ciently risk averse, so that con-
dition (1) is true. There exists an r, such that for for any given Rl, r >
r
¯
and p  0 there is a q^ < 1 such that the risky contract (strictly) dominates
the bank-run-proof contract if, and only if, q > q^ (q > q^), with @q^
@p
< 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
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For a given q; a higher level of p may induce individuals to choose a
risky contract. Thus, the higher liquidity of investments can generate a
higher probability of crisis. This is true since a high liquidation price p
lowers the cost of a bank run and thus individuals may prefer contracts
that are not bank-run proof. One can argue therefore that a higher level
of p, i.e. an higher level of asset liquidity, may be the result of an e¢ cient,
well-functioning nancial market. Proposition 2 implies that an e¢ cient
secondary market for nancial assets may actually increase the risk of a
banking crisis.
Note nally that proposition 2 shows the existence a threshold q^ such that
below this threshold a bank prefer a safe contract. In that sense, proposition
2 obtains qualitatively the same results as proposition 1 (related to the simple
case where liquidation cost p = 1):
5 Conclusions and Empirical Observations
In this nal section, we present some empirical observations consistent with
the nding that high growth expectation increases the risk of crisis through
high interest rate.
From table 1 in the introduction, we observed that the frequency of crisis
for country with more than 5 years of growth larger than 3 percent a year is
substantially and systematically higher than in the other countries (we hence-
forth dene countries meeting these criteria as fast growing economies). The
high-growth economies selected in our sample can be considered as emerg-
ing economies, and, more to the point of our model, economies where in
those specic years individuals saw themselves as pre-rich.A stagnating
economy presents, by denition, a pattern of low or negative growth; on the
other side, developed economies usually present business cycle behavior with
a peak and a low about every ve years. Therefore, considering ve years of
sustained growth should exclude both stagnating and rich economies, and se-
lect economies where individuals expect, with an high probability, to become
rich in the future.22
22The countries and the observation periods in the sub-sample: Bahamas, 1981-
Botswana,1981-92- Cameroon, 1986-87- Congo, Rep.,1983- Cyprus, 1981- Dominica, 1985-
Egypt, 1984-86- Guyana,1996-98- Iceland, 1981- Indonesia, 1991-97- Ireland, 1999- Korea,
Rep. 1986-97- Malaysia, 1981-97- Malta, 1981-82- Malta, 1992-98- Mauritius 1990-99-
Oman, 1986- Portugal, 1991-92- Singapore, 1981-82- Singapore,1992-98- Sri Lanka, 1982-
Thailand 1989- 97.
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Accordingly, an empirical support for our model would be that high de-
posit interest rates explain the higher frequency of crisis in the fast growing
economies as shown in Table 1. Obviously, evidence of this sort is at best
indicative (since it does not imply a direct causality between growth expecta-
tion and interest rates), but it does accord broadly with the basic predictions
of our model.
Several papers nd a positive correlation between domestic interest rates
and probability of crisis (e.g. Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998 and
2002; and Hardy and Pazarbasioglu, 1998). Our data suggest this corre-
lation is true only in high-growth economies. In the following econometric
exercise, we broadly follow Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998 and 2002,
(henceforth DKD) with one important di¤erence: we interact the real interest
rates with past growth rates.
We follow DKD in the denition of banking crises, who include in the
Dataset the most seriousepisodes among all the crisis listed in Caprio and
Kingebiel (1999) and Lingren, Gillian, and Saal (1996).23 Accordingly, we
determine a dummy variable Crisisi;t, which takes the value one when a
banking crisis occurs in country i and time t; and 0 otherwise. The years of
crisis after the rst have been excluded from the sample to avoid problems of
endogeneity. For the same reason, we will lag all the independent variables
of one period.
To distinguish the fast growing economies, we determine the dummy vari-
able
RHi;t 1 =

1 if growthi;t 1 > 3%, ... ; growthi;t 6 > 3%
0 otherwise
:
23The crisis considered in our sample are: 1990-96, Bangladesh- 1988-93, Burk-
ina Faso- 1987-92, Cameroon-1987-92, Cameroon-1995-98, Cape Verde- 1988-
99, Central African Republic- 1979-92, Chad- 1992-99, Congo, Rep.- 1987-98,
Costa Rica- 1988-91, Cote dIvoire- 1996-1999, Ecuador- 1989, El Salvador- 1991-
94, Finland- 1982-99, Ghana- 1993, Guinea- 1995-97, Guinea-Bissau- 1992-94,
Indonesia- 1998-99, Indonesia- 1990-93, Italy- 1994-99, Jamaica- 1992-99, Japan-
1985-91, Kenya- 1997-99, Korea, Rep.-1985-88, Malaysia- 1997-99, Malaysia-
1987-88, Mali- 1984-91, Mauritania- 1994-99, Mexico- 1988-91, Nepal- 1983-90,
Niger- 1990-95, Nigeria- 1987-93, Norway- 1988-89, Panama- 1989-99, Papua New
Guinea- 1995-99, Paraguay- 1998-99, Philippines- 1981-91, Philippines- 1983-91,
Senegal- 1990-99, Sierra Leone- 1988-93 Sri Lanka- 1995, Swaziland- 1991-94,
Sweden- 1984-87, Thailand- 1997-99, Thailand- 1993, Togo- 1982-93 Trinidad and
Tobago- 1990-98, Uganda- 1981-83, Uruguay- 1993-99, Venezuela- 1996, Zambia-
1995-99 Zimbabwe.
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for country i at time t  1: In other words, RHi;t 1 = 1 when a country has
experienced at least 5 years of uninterrupted growth at 3 percent at least.
We consider all countries in the World Bank development indicators 2004
(WDI) database from 1976 to 1999. Since each observation contains a vari-
able lagged up to six years, our sample is restricted to the period 19821999
with gaps from missing data and data for subsequent crisis years deliberately
omitted. We also exclude centrally planned economies and economies in tran-
sition. In this way, we are left with 107 countries and 46 crisis episodes, for
a total of 1,274 observations in the regressions with the largest sample.24
The other explanatory variable is the Real Deposit Interest RateRDIRt 1,
which is determined by subtracting from the deposit interest rate paid by
commercial or similar banks (IMFs International Financial Statistics dataset)
the contemporaneous rate of ination, measured by the GNP deator (World
Bank).
Following this literature (e.g. DKD 2001) the control variables are: the
Log per capita GDP, Log (GDP/CAP)t 1 (from WDI), as a proxy for the
quality of bank regulation and the legal and institutional environment, the
growth rate of the domestic credit provided by the banking sector (in per-
centage of the GDP) between time t  1 and t  2, Creditgrowtht 1, to con-
trol for the possibility of an over-borrowing syndrome by banks (IMF-IFS
dataset); the real currency devaluation with respect to the USD exchange
rate, Depreciationt 1; which is obtained by subtracting from the nominal de-
preciation rate with respect to the USD the di¤erential between internal and
US ination rate (IMF-IFS dataset); to test whether the crises are driven
by excessive foreign exchange risk exposure; the ination rate, Inationt 1;
24The countries in our sample are: Algeria, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo,
Rep., Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, Arab Rep., El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland,
France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kenya, Korea, Rep., Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Monzambique, Namibia,
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian
Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia, Zim-
babwe
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in terms of GDP deator, to account for central bank monetary policy and
macroeconomic mismanagement; and the bank reserve in percentage of the
total bank assets, Reservest 1.
Again following the literature, we use a Logit model to estimate the re-
gressions; moreover we introduce a random e¤ect to control for countries
heterogeneity. These results are reported in Table 2.
We run regression 1 and 2, without control variables: the e¤ect of the real
deposit interest rate RDIR interacted with the dummy RH is positive and
highly signicant, while it is not signicant on its own. The dummyRH is not
signicant and becomes signicant when introduced without RHRDIR, as
it is shown in regression 2 (and consistently with table 1 in the introduction).
This implies that real interest rate entirely explain in our model the higher
probability of crisis in fast growing countries .
In the following regressions, we introduce the control variables, but this
does not substantially change our main result: the coe¢ cient of RHRDIR
is still highly signicant in all regressions. Consider regression 3, the variable
Log (GDP/CAP)t 1 is negative and signicant at ve percent level. The
currency real devaluation, Depreciationt 1; is not signicant, this seems to
exclude the external capital channel as a general determinant of banking
crises.25
The bank domestic credit growth rate, Creditgrowtht 1, is not signi-
cant.26 Furthermore, in regression 4 we interacted Creditgrowtht 1 withRH ,
the coe¢ cient of this interacted term, RHCreditgrowtht 1; is not signicant
nor does it change the coe¢ cient of RHRDIR. This last nding does not
seem to support the explanation that high interest rates could be generated
by the supply of credit for excessively risky project when growth expectations
are high. If this were the case, before the crisis we should have observed, a
systematic growth of the credit supply in the growing economies.27
To verify whether the result is driven solely by the east Asian crisis, we
run regression 5, which excludes 1996 and subsequent years. The signicance
25If a crisis would have been generated by a sudden halt in the inow of external capital,
the crisis should have been preceded by a devaluation of the domestic currency (i.e. the sign
should have been positive). This would have been generated by a massive sale of domestic
currency either to buy dollars and repay loans denominated in domestic currency or to
liquidate assets denominated in foreign currency. Both DKD (1998) and Eichengreen and
Arteta (2000) obtain a similar result. However, the depreciation appears positively related
to the crisis in DKD (2002).
26DKD (1998) obtain the same result, while in DKD (2002) this coe¢ cient is weakly
positive.
27Caprio and Kingebiel 1996b show evidence supporting a similar conclusion.
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of the coe¢ cient of RHRDIR changes only marginally, while its magnitude
actually increases.
We now summarize the main ndings of this paper. The model empha-
sized how an higher level of vulnerability to banking crisis can be optimal in
fast developing countries; to the best of our knowledge this result is new in
the literature on nancial crisis. It also pointed out how an external inter-
vention is desirable and a bail-out to rescue banks can be welfare-improving
even if it ex-ante increases the fragility of the nancial system.28 We then
showed that individuals may prefer a riskier banking system to the extend
that a more e¢ cient nancial market decreases the costs to liquidate long-
term assets. In this nal section of the paper, we saw how high interest rates
are good predictor of crisis only for fast growing economies.
28This last point is empirically supported by Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002),
who nd a strong positive e¤ect of deposit insurance on the probability of crisis
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Table 2. Deposit interest rates and banking crises
1 2 3 4 5
years 82  99 82  99 82  99 82  99 82  95
Log (GDP/CAP)t 1 -.44** -.44** -.401*
(.231) (.232) (.237)
Creditgrowtht 1 -.575 .906 .667
(.805) (.901) (.928)
Depreciationt 1 -.072 -.072 -.166
(.093) (.093) (.117)
Reservest 1 -.010 -.010 -.008
(.010) (.010) (.009)
Inationt 1 -.046 -.045 -.150
(.093) (.093) (.117)
Cons. -3.41*** -3.41*** -3.05*** -3.07*** -2.47***
(.16) (.16) (.444) (.446) (0.533)
RDIRt 1 -.004 -.0008 .019 .018 .005
(-.011) (.0013) (.016) .016 .018
RHRDIRt 1 .440*** .411*** .406*** .618**
(.158) (.165) (.166) (.281)
RH -.86 1.21*** -.89 -.683 -2.73
(1.04) (.408) ( 1.08) (1.09) (1.97)
RHCreditgrowtht 1 -1.93
(3.04)
No. of obs. 1274 1274 1274 1274 1007
No. of crises 46 46 46 46 39
No. of countries 107 107 107 107 103
No. RH = 1 80 80 80 80 58
Wald 2 22.92*** 8.93*** 29.94*** 30.20** 15.24**
*Signicant at 10%; ** Signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of lemma 1
The following table shows the strategy payo¤s for a patient individuals in
the event  = 1
2
: when only impatient withdraw,29 and  2 [1
2
; 1): when   1
2
patient individuals decide to run to the bank as well.
Impatient Individual Payo¤s
 = 1
2
 > 1
2
W c1 12c1 + (1  12)(2  c1)
N (2  c1)R (2  c1)
When (2) is true, c1 > (2  c1)R > (2  c1) ( recalling that R > 1), so that
withdrawing early (W) is the only dominant strategy of the game.
A.2 Proof of lemma 2
Suppose conversely that there is a bank run when R = Rh. From lemma
1, this happens only when c1 > 2R
h
Rh+1
: In this case, there will be a bank run
when R = Rl as well, and all assets will be liquidated at time 1. This is not
an optimal equilibrium since individuals can do strictly better in autarky by
liquidating assets only if she is impatient.
A.3 Proof for proposition 1
To determine when a bank-run-proof contract is actually chosen, we consider
separately the two sub-problems (5) and (7) of problem (4).
Condition (8) determines c11; the internal solution of problem (5) and con-
dition (9) determine c21; the internal solution of problem (7). Given condition
u0(0) = 1, cj1 < 2, with j = 1; 2. Using condition (1)that is equivalent to
assuming that xu0(x) is decreasingwe show now that if q > 0 then @c
j
1
@r
> 0
and @c
j
1
@q
> 0: Let us consider 8. Using the implicit function theorem and the
29Note that if the strategy is W when  = 12 ; the agent is the only impatient withrawing.
Given that we are in the continuum case her payo¤ is c1 since the probability of arriving
among the rst 12 individuals is one.
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envelop theorem we will argue that
@c11
@r
=
q
 
u0((2  c11)
 
r +Rl

) + (2  c11) (r +R) u00((2  c11) (r +R))

u00(c11) + (1  q) R2 u00((2  c11) R) + q (r +R)2 u00((2  c11) (r +R))
> 0:
Indeed, given (1) the numerator is positive, while the denominator is always
negative. Using again the implicit function theorem:
@c11
@q
=
 Ru0((2  c11) R) + (r +R) u0((2  c11) (r +R))
u00(c11) + (1  q) R2 u00((2  c11) R) + q (r +R)2 u00((2  c11) (r +R))
> 0
the numerator is negative given (1) (which implies x0u0(x) decreasing) and the
denominator is always negative, given u00 < 0:Moreover notice that since we
assumed u unbounded above we have limr!1 c11 =1 The same properties
applies to c21 using (9).(i.e.
@c21
@r
> 0, @c
2
1
@q
> 0 and limr!1 c21 =1)
Considering c11;when q = 0; constraint (6) is never binding: This is true
since (8) implies c11 < (2   c11)Rl or c11 < c  2R
l
Rl+1
. Moreover, let q = 1 and
dene c(Rh; 1) :
u0(c(Rh; 1)) = Rhu0
 
(2  c(Rh; 1)Rh);
recalling that Rh = Rl + r, we can always nd an r large enough such that
c(Rh; 1) > 2R
l
Rl+1
.
Therefore, there always exits a r > r
¯
such that there is a q=q(r):
u0(c) = q(Rl + r)u0
 
(2  c)(Rl + r)+ (1  q)Rlu0  (2  c)Rl (20)
such that c11(q) =
2Rl
Rl+1
, hence constraint (6) is binding for q >q > 0. Ac-
cordingly, we have shown that for any given r > r, c1 = c
1
1(q) i¤ q <q and
c1 =
2Rl
Rl+1
only if q q:
We now prove that there exists a q(r) > q(r) = q : c1 = c
2
1(q) if and only if
q  q: Consider problem (7) for q >q. Given (20) and that Rlu0  (2  c)Rl <
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u0 ((2  c)) ; in the interval [q,1] we can dene a ~q = ~q(r)
u0(c) = ~q(Rl + r)u0

2(1  1
2
c)(Rl + r)

+ (1  ~q)u0

2(1  1
2
c)

; (21)
hence c21(~q) = c:
Therefore in the interval q > ~q,,we dene function DV  V br   V rp, i.e.
DV =
(1  q)

1
2
u(c21) +
1
2
u

2(1  1
2
c21)

  u(c)

+
q

1
2
u(c21) +
1
2
u
 
2( 1  1
2
c21)(R
l + r)
  1
2
u(c)
 1
2
u
 
2( 1  1
2
c)(Rl + r)
  :
The rst term on the RHS is strictly negative. This is true since u(c) >
u(1
2
c21+(1  12 c21)) > 12u(c21)+ 12u(2(1  12 c21)), recalling that c > 1: The second
term is positive: function 1
2
u(c) + 1
2
u
 
2( 1  1
2
c)(Rl + r)

is increasing in
c  c21 because u0(c21) > (Rl + r)u0
 
2(1  1
2
c21)(R
l + r)

: The last point is
true given (9) and given that (1) implies that Ru0
 
2(1  1
2
c)R

is decreasing
in R. Thus, 1
2
u(c21) +
1
2
u
 
2( 1  1
2
c21)R
h

>.1
2
u(c) + 1
2
u
 
2( 1  1
2
c)Rh

since
c < c21.
Using these observations and the envelope theorem we have
@DV
@q
> 0: (22)
Moreover:
 DV is continuous for q > ~q.
 DV (~q; r) = (1  ~q)   1
2
u(c) + 1
2
u
 
2(1  1
2
c)

< 0
 DV (1; r) > 0 (as shown above)
Therefore for a given r > r
¯
there exist a q = q(r) : q > ~q > q implicitly
dened as V br(q; r) = V rp(q; r); such that V br(q; r)  V rp(q; r) if q  q:
While, for q < q; the bank-run-proof contract is either preferred or the only
feasible. Accordingly for a xed r >r, the optimal c1 = c
2
1(q):in the interval
q  q:
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The last point, @q
@r
< 0 can be proved noticing that
@DV
@r
=
( 1  1
2
c21)u
0

2( 1  1
2
c21)(R
l + r)

 ( 1  1
2
c)u`

2( 1  1
2
c)(Rl + r)

> 0
given (1) and that ( 1  1
2
c21) < ( 1  12 c):While
@q
@r
< 0 directly follows from
(20).
A.4 Proof of proposition 2
Considering rst problem 16. given constraint (17), we dene the following
Lagrangian:
La(L; ) =
1
2
u(2L) + (
1
2
)(qu
 
2((1  L)Rh)+ (23)
(1  q)u  2((1  L)Rl)) + (L  Rl
1 +Rl
)
The KT condition implies:
u`(2L) = qRhu`
 
2((1  L)Rh)+ (1  q)Rlu`  2((1  L)Rl)) + 
two possible solutions
L = L =
Rl
1 +Rl
L = L1a
where:
u`(2L1a) = qR
hu`
 
2((1  L1a)Rh)

+ (1  q)Rlu`  2((1  L1a)Rl))
using the implicit function theorem we can see that L1a is increasing in r and
q (recall that we dened Rh = Rl + r) And for q = 0 , L1a < R
l
1+Rl
; while for
q = 1, there exist an r > 0 such that L1a > R
l
1+Rl
(recall that we assumed u()
unbounded above). Therefore, there exist a r > 0 such that for any r  r
there is a q(r)  1; such that the constraint of (23) is binding for q >q(r)
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where q(r) is dened as:
u`(2L) = q(Rl+r)u`
 
2((1  L)(Rl + r))+(1 q)Rlu`  2((1  L)Rl)) (24)
with
@q(r)
@r
< 0:
Clearly in this in this space (q q(r) and r  r) :
c = 2L
while for q <q(r), L = L1a < R
l
1+Rl
and c1 = 2L and this is the best contract.
Considering subproblem ( 18), only dened in the space q >q(r) (hence,
when q q(r) the unconstrained subproblem (16) yields the optimal solu-
tion), there are only two solutions c^1 and L^ satisfying the following condi-
tions:
u`(c1)  qu`(2((1  L)Rh + L  1
2
c1) 
(1  q)u`(2((1  L)p+ L  1
2
c1)) = 0 (25)
(1  q)(1  p)u`(2((1  L)p+ L  1
2
c1)) 
q(Rh   1)u`(2((1  L)Rh + L  1
2
c1)) = 0 (26)
they exist in q >q(r) since c^1 increasing in r and in q and unbounded in r
(given that u() is unbounded above); and 2L > c1 (given that banks will
never liquidate assets before time 2, if there is not a bank run). Comparing
now the two contracts when q >q(r) :
DVL = V
br
L   V rpL (27)
= (1  q)

1
2
u(c^1) +
1
2
u

2((1  L)p+ L^  1
2
c^1)

  u(c)

+
q
 
1
2
u(c^1) +
1
2
u

2((1  L^)Rh + L^  1
2
c^1)

 1
2
u(c)  1
2
u
 
2
 
1  L Rh
!
the second is positive for the same argument seen in the previous section.
27
Proto: Bank Fragility and Growth Expectations
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
The rst term is negative since given the concavity of u :
u(
1
2
c^1+
1
2

2((1  L)p+ L^  1
2
c^1)

>
1
2
u(c^1)+
1
2
u

2((1  L)p+ L^  1
2
c^1)

and
c >
1
2
c^1 +
1
2

2((1  L)p+ L^  1
2
c^1)

= (1  L^)p+ L^
(recall that c > 1): Therefore, using the envelope theorem, we have that
dDVL
dq
> 0 and xing an r > r, there exist a q^ such that DVL > 0 i¤ q > q^:
Moreover, if we notice that dDVL
dp
> 0 (since V brL is increasing in p and V
rp
L
is independent); we can argue that, dq^(r)
dp
< 0: For p ! 1 we are in the case
analyzed in the previous section, where c1 = 2L . We can therefore argue
that there is a r > r
¯
such that q^(1) > q(r), thus q^(p) > q(r) for all p 2 (0; 1)
(recall that q does not depend on p). Accordingly, we can state that for
any p the is a q^(p) such that the risky contract is preferred whenever q >
q^(p) > q(r):
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